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Abstract 
A critical element in designing a biomedical research platform is the design of a responsible data-sharing mechanism. Such 
mechanism should provide high utility data in an efficient and timely manner. Existing platforms do not deliver on both 
timeliness and utility. In this paper, we present a theoretical privacy protection framework. The framework proposes a smart 
honest broker system that provides data requests with a privacy protection that matches their posed risk. It promises to deliver on 
both fronts. 
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1. Introduction 
Biomedical data holds the potential to great knowledge discovery through research and the promise to drive 
medicine to a more personalized level. Vast biomedical data warehouses are now under construction in various parts 
of the world to facilitate secondary usage of this rich data and to provide proper tools to manipulate it and analyse it. 
A critical element in designing these platforms is the design of efficient and responsible data-sharing mechanisms. 
The use of biomedical data for research is governed by privacy regulations1,2. These generally mandate the approval 
of an Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the use of any identifiable data in research. Thus, most existing 
biomedical platforms lightly de-identify their data warehouse and regulate investigators’ access to the de-identified 
data through an IRB3–5. However, exclusive reliance on the IRB for research regulation has proven to be inefficient6. 
IRB processes worldwide are often very lengthy, enough to hinder timely discoveries.  
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Generally, when data is de-identified (i.e. when protected health information (PHI) is removed from the dataset), 
it can be exempt from IRB approval. Thus, to remedy the problem of timeliness, few platforms opted to employ an 
IRB-approved Honest Broker system (HBS)7,8. HBS provides de-identified data to individual investigators: the data 
is often de-identified then stored in a data warehouse. Investigators request subsets of the de-identified data through 
the HBS. The requested data is exported to investigators after signing a data use agreement. Such schema, while 
timely, suffers from several shortcomings:  
• Investigators may not request all the variables they need through the HBS, as required variables could be omitted 
during the de-identification process. 
• The decision on data requests is binary, the requested data is either granted to the investigator in question or not. 
The criteria upon which the decision is based are implicit and subjective, and  
• All granted data requests are treated equally (with respect to de-identification) without regard to the particular 
privacy risk posed by each request. In fact, some investigators have a good track record and pose less privacy 
risk than others. Particularly if they belong to a research institution that follows stringent privacy and security 
policies. On the other hand, different data subsets vary with respect to their capacity for privacy invasion, HIV 
related data poses a greater potential for injury than flu related data.  
 A sensible way to overcome the problems above is by offering a multi-level privacy protection model through 
the HBS. The model should provide data requests with a level of protection that matches their posed risks. In other 
words, the risk posed by a data request should be automatically evaluated, and matched with a protection level that 
meets the calculated risk. In this manuscript, we present the first attempt toward the proposition and formalization of 
a multi-levelled privacy protection Honest Broker System. If properly designed, such HBS has the potential to 
eliminate reliance on IRBs by formalizing complex scenarios such as: 
a. HIV data can only be accessed by investigators belonging to highly trusted institutions with no 
history of breaches, provided that subjects consented for research. Such access should be 
performed from the premises of the institution in question, and the exported data should be PHI 
free.  
b. Data regarding sexually transmitted diseases can only be accessed by highly trusted research 
institution. Such data should never leave the premises of the data holder and it should be de-
identified as per the Safe harbour standard. 
To realize our proposed HBS, we need to institute (A) an objective way to evaluate the privacy risk posed by a 
data request, (B) a de-identification scale with multiple data protection levels and (C) a set of decision rules to match 
computed risks with appropriate protection levels:  
(A) Inspired by the work of9, we identify three independent factors that affect the privacy risk posed by a 
data request (referred to as Risk Score or RS): 
• Requestor risk (RR), or the level of risk posed by the data requestor. This will be defined as the risk 
posed by the research institutes that employ the investigators rather than the investigators 
themselves, as we adopt the view that the institution is accountable for its employees. 
• Data Sensitivity (DS), or the sensitivity of the information being disclosed, and 
• Study Purpose (SP), or the usages the recipient will make with the information. Note that if detailed 
(informed) consent from the data subjects is available and codified, then the purpose of the study 
could be matched against subjects’ consent for conformance. However, in this paper, we assume that 
consent is one-dimensional, i.e. subjects either consent for research (opt in) or not, and that studies 
with “research” as the stated purpose, will all qualify for data access. 
(B) For the multiple data protection levels, we offer (i) multiple data access modes with varying degrees of 
accessibility, and (ii) a de-identification scale with multiple de-identification levels offering variable 
degrees of re-identification risk.  
(C) The decision rules for matching risk scores with de-identification levels and access modes should be set 
by the concerned IRBs, nonetheless we provide recommendations on how to set these rules in the next 
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section.  
Our HBS schema presents several advantages: (i) it formalizes the data access framework, makes it more 
transparent and limits subjectivity. (ii) It provides trusted investigators with accurate data thereby (potentially) 
reducing the burden on IRBs. (iii) More importantly, it will encourage higher privacy and security standards at 
research institutions.  
In the next section, we present an overview of our projected platform and of the data access framework followed 
by a discussion of future directions. 
2. System Description 
Our projected data-request process provides investigators a choice of applying to HBS, IRB or both. An application 
to HBS makes sense when de-identified data is satisfactory, otherwise, if more detailed data is required, 
investigators should apply to the IRB. An application to both allows the investigator to formulate their hypothesis 
and to perform preliminary work while the IRB application runs its course. Fig. 1 depicts our projected data request 
process: 
• Investigators requesting a data set from the HBS are assigned a Risk Score based on two factors: the institution 
they belong to (RR), and the data they requested (DS). Each risk score will be matched with a default de-
identification level and a default data access mode. Investigators will be granted timely access to data de-
identified according to their default level.  
• If a higher level of precision is required, the investigator needs to go through the IRB process. The IRB 
application procedure is an extensive one, possibly involving multiple re-submissions and reviews. The review 
and decision process is completely governed by the IRB committee. 
The final IRB/HBS decision is fed to a data extraction tool along with specifications detailing the data granted as 
well as the mode of access allowed. The data extraction tool extracts the data from the data warehouse into a data 
mart. If the IRB/HBS specifications require additional de-identification, then a de-identification tool applies the 












Fig. 1. Data request flowchart process. 
In what follows, we give an overview of existing de-identification mechanisms and suggest de-identification 
scales that are appropriate for our context. The scales will be based on the de-identification mechanisms that have 
been used for biomedical data sharing. Then we present the different data access modes offered by the platform and 
we conclude this section with a presentation on how to evaluate the privacy risk posed by a data request.  
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2.1. De-identification scales 
Privacy-preserving mechanisms can be divided into two broad categories: process driven and data driven. In 
process driven mechanisms, the dataset is held by a trusted server, users query the data through the server and 
privacy is built into the algorithms that access the data. Differential privacy is the most popular process-driven 
privacy model10. It perturbs records in a random but controlled manner. Differential privacy provides strong proofs 
for privacy, but often leads to low utility particularly in studies that rely on rare events (such as association studies 
that look at rare genetic events)11,12. In such events, it could lead to strange data representations and erroneous 
associations13. However, because it provides strong proofs of privacy it can be used with less trusted investigators, 
i.e. in cases where privacy supersedes utility. 
Data driven approaches suppress or modify the variables that could allow an attacker to know precisely the 
owner of a particular record, these are referred to as potentially identifying variables (PIVs). However, isolating 
such variables in a general context is a very challenging task, it requires knowledge of the variables that potential 
attackers might use to link a subject record with an identity, i.e. it requires modeling the knowledge and capacity of 
potential (but unknown) data recipients/attackers. To overcome these challenges, some data-driven mechanisms 
revert to using a fixed set of PIVs (these consist of the commonly known identifiers, and of attributes that have been 
used in the past to breach privacy). These mechanisms are known as heuristic de-identifications. Heuristic de-
identifications are easy to implement as they do not rely heavily on the underlying dataset, however, they do not 
always offer adequate protection for the data subjects13,14. Nonetheless, all operating biomedical data warehouses 
use heuristic methods for data sharing3–5,15. The most popular heuristic de-identifications are the safe harbor and the 
limited dataset of the HIPAA privacy rule2. The safe harbor standard stipulates the removal of 18 variables from 
the dataset. These variables include names, geographical locations of population size smaller than 20,000, dates of 
higher granularity than years, and all uniquely identifying variables. The limited dataset standard stipulates the 
removal of 16 of the 18 safe Harbor variables from the dataset. All direct identifiers are removed; dates and 
geographical locations are kept. A third commonly used static de-identification lies between the two standards 
presented above. We will refer to it as the intermediate standard. It is similar to the safe harbor but instead of 
omitting dates, it shifts them between 1 and 364 days into the past. The shifting value is different across records and 
identical within the same record.  Thus research that requires temporal analyses would be possible using this 
standard4. A heuristic de-identification scale could be defined by these three standards.  
Despite the aforementioned controversy, some data-driven methods try to model the background knowledge of 
potential recipients by introducing assumptions about the kind of information that attackers may possess and set the 
PIVs accordingly; these are known as the Statistical de-identification mechanisms. Opponents of these methods 
claim that the assumptions will never be accurate or comprehensive, while proponents argue that their methods 
perform well in real life applications. The most commonly used PIVs are demographics16 (commonly known as 
quasi-identifiers), however, it has been argued that diagnostic codes could also be used by adversaries to identify the 
subjects. In fact one GWAS study showed that more than 96% of 2700 patients have unique combination of 
diagnosis codes17. Statistical de-identification modifies the PIVs so as to lower the re-identification risk to an 
acceptable (and pre-defined) level. k-anonymity is the most popular of these techniques18. It works by suppressing or 
generalizing PIVs to make at least k records in the database identical on their PIVs. The aim is to hide every 
individual in a crowd of k look-alikes19. k-anonymity is not yet implemented in any existing biomedical data 
warehouse, however it is widely used in individual cases of data sharing13,18,20–23. Different de-identification levels 
could be set through the value k, the higher the k value, the lower the precision of the data (and the probability of re-
identification). Therefore another scale could be based on k-anonymity. Different levels could be realized by varying 
the k value. Commonly used values range from 2 to 1516. Additional de-identification scales could be defined using 
a combination of the presented de-identification mechanisms. 
2.2. Access modes 
Two main modes of data access will be offered: export mode and local access mode. In the export mode, 
investigators receive a copy of the requested data, and thus it becomes completely under their obligation. For the 
local access mode, the generated data mart is stored locally in the platform. Investigators must access the data 
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through the platform, such access will be regulated by the HBS. The local access scheme will enable access audits 
and force restrictions on data sharing. As such, it can be used with less trusted institutions. Several variations of the 
local access mode could be offered as well, these would restrict time and location of access. 
2.3. Risk scores 
In what follows, we talk about the quantification of the risk posed by a data request from two dimensions: 
institution and data:  
The security and privacy practices at the investigator’s institution are the major factors that shape the RR 
level. El Emam et al.20 introduced a checklist that can be used to evaluate the extent to which such practices have 
been implemented. The checklist contains important but straightforward questions about the privacy and security 
controls implemented at the investigator’s institution. The checklist inquires whether security and privacy policies 
and protocols are followed at the institution, whether the institution employs a privacy officer to enforce the 
policies, whether it offers mandatory training regarding the handling/sharing of private information, whether 
surprise audits from an independent third party are allowed, and whether the data will be placed in secure locations. 
The checklist also inquires about the geographical location of the institution to make sure that similar privacy laws 
are enforceable. Completion of the checklist is a straightforward task. The total number of unchecked items is one 
way for quantifying the institutions’ risk. A more robust quantification would assign varying weights to the different 
checklist items. Such weights would be best set by the concerned IRB, however items related to institutions’ 
location and third party audits should bear high weights. The checklist should be filled by a representative from the 
institution. Through independent third party audits, the HBS can establish the truthfulness of the responses and with 
time it will have built-in profiles for the different institutions. 
The sensitivity of the requested data is a critical risk factor. Patients’ data tend to have variable sensitivity 
rates, for example, HIV and mental disorders are regarded as highly sensitive attributes24. Assigning sensitivities to 
the different data attributes is a subjective exercise. The reason is that these sensitivities vary between individuals, 
cultures and situations. As such, they should be created by experts on social perceptions or by gathering such social 
perceptions through other means, such as surveys25. Once gathered, these perceptions should be applied on the 
different attributes through a rating that specifies the sensitivity level. The overall sensitivity of a requested data 
subset would be a function of the individual sensitivities of the requested data items. Having a sensitivity ratings for 
the different fields within the dataset facilitates the risk calculation, eliminates subjectivity and delivers on the 
timeliness requirement. 
3. Discussion and Future Work 
Contrary to common beliefs, de-identification does not completely eliminate re-identification risk. More 
importantly, the residual re-identification risk of a de-identified dataset cannot be quantified precisely. In fact, it is 
not possible to measure the exact likelihood of the data falling into malicious hands (however small it is), nor the 
capacity of these malicious hands to perform a privacy breach. Therefore, it is important to understand the risks 
posed by data requests from all possible dimensions and to use additional protection methods alongside de-
identification (such as data access modes). Currently, to realize our model, we are tackling the following issues: (i) 
assigning sensitivities to the different data attributes, (ii) extending the current risk score definition to account for 
the risk posed by the individuals requesting the data (investigators), in terms of their motivation and ability to re-
identify the data. And, (iii) collaborating with the IRB at Sidra Medical and Research Center to define an initial set 
of broad risk classes (as an initial step), and match each class with a level of privacy protection. 
In the near future, we hope to extend the HBS system to provide different forms of genetic data. For that, we are 
trying to identify the different types of genetic data that can be generated, and to study the re-identification power of 
each form of this data. The purpose is to build a genomic privacy risk meter. The meter would sort genetic data 
based on its identifying power. Investigators could then be provided with the genomic data type that fits their risk 
score. 
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